This paper presents new estimates of pass-through coefficients from international to domestic food prices by country in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The estimates indicate that, despite the use of food price subsidies and other government interventions, a rise in global food prices is transmitted to a significant degree into domestic food prices in many MENA countries, although cross-country variation is significant. In nearly all countries, domestic food prices are highly downwardly rigid. The finding of asymmetric price transmission suggests that not only international food price levels matter, but also food price volatility. High food pass-through tends to increase inflation pressures, where food consumption shares are high. Domestic factors, often linked to storage, logistics, and procurement, have also played a major role in explaining high food inflation in the majority of MENA countries.
Introduction
There is a belief that households in the Middle East and North Africa 1 (MENA) should be largely insulated from fluctuations in global food prices. The region stands out among other developing regions for its extensive use of price subsidies and controls (Ortiz et al., 2011) . In addition, governments in MENA employ other policies aimed at managing and regulating food consumption, production and trade. 2 These include production subsidies, import protection cuts, and build-up of food reserves.
At the same time, high and volatile international food prices continue to be a major concern in the MENA region, and some have even cited them as a contributing factor in the Arab Spring (Breisinger et al. 2011; Zurayk, 2011) . Food prices rose substantially during the second half of the 2000s, and even though prices plunged during the global economic and financial crisis, they recovered rapidly in 2010 before coming down somewhat in 2011 (Figure 1 ). At present, the aggregate food price index is above the levels observed in the mid-2000s, and prices of certain food items remain high (World Bank 2012a).
High international food prices feature prominently in public policy discussions in the Middle East and North Africa for a number of good reasons. Dependence on imported food is substantial and likely to grow in the future. Using data from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) this paper shows that the region meets through imports about half of its wheat and barley consumption requirements, 40 percent of its rice consumption, and nearly 70 percent of its corn consumption (Table 1 ). The region is the largest wheat importer in the world, and wheat prices increased by 70 percent in the second half of the 2000s. With expected high population growth rates and climate change that is likely to raise the frequency of draughts and water scarcity, MENA"s import dependence will only grow going 1 In this paper we use interchangeably the terms "MENA" and "Arab world." The definition of MENA corresponds to the operational definition of the Middle East and North Africa region of the World Bank, which includes most members of the Arab League and Iran. We also refer to three main subgroups in MENA: the oil importing economies which include Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Djibouti, and the West Bank and Gaza; the oil exporting economies of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; and the GCC economies comprised of UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait. 2 Ortiz et al. (2011) have a list of policy interventions by country and developing region.
forward. Finally, high malnutrition rates in the developing parts of the region suggest that a large number of households are highly vulnerable to food price shocks. The economics literature provides little empirical insight into how much international food price shocks impact on domestic prices in individual MENA countries. The exception is a working paper by Albers and Peeters (2011) presenting food price transmission effects for a few countries in the Mediterranean region. Also, Crowley (2010) finds that commodity prices exhibit a strong and mostly significant impact on domestic inflation for a cross-section panel of countries in MENA and Central Asia. Limited access to data has been a key reason for the absence of empirical work on MENA countries. This paper, therefore, fills a void by presenting new estimates of food pass-through coefficients from international to domestic prices for all MENA countries, using a data base collected from various sources throughout the region.
As international food prices increased significantly in recent years, 3 nearly all countries experienced an increase in their domestic food prices. Still, the question concerning the extent to which international food prices affect domestic food prices requires an empirical investigation. Domestic price levels can be affected not only by world food prices movements, but also by a number of country-specific factors, including food price policies, such as price controls and subsidies, trade and production policies, domestic supply chain issues, food stock management, 3 International food prices, measured by the World Bank food price index, increased by 76 percent from December 2006 to April 2011. infrastructure, weather patterns, and exchange rates, among many others. For these reasons, food dependency ratios will not reveal the extent to which international food price movements are transmitted to domestic food prices. long-lasting effects on overall (headline) inflation, in particular for countries with less firmly anchored inflation expectations (Walsh, 2011) . Food inflation can also be transmitted to core inflation through higher inflationary expectations and workers" demands for higher wages. It has been shown that in MENA food inflation exhibits strong short-run effects on non-food inflation (IMF, 2011) .
Tight supplies in relatively thin global food commodity markets put countries with high food dependency ratios at risk of disruptions in procurement, shortfalls in food availability, and food inflation (Famine Early Warning Systems Network, 2011).
Within these countries, food inflation is a particular threat to the urban poor, allocating a large share of their expenditures to food. Even relatively modest price increases can deprive them of adequate access to food.
This paper aims to assess the magnitude of risks stemming from high international food prices and volatility by country. We provide country estimates of international food price pass-through to domestic food prices in MENA and identify the contribution of other factors -internal and external -to domestic food price fluctuations. As we show, the pass-through estimates vary significantly because of individual country characteristics, including exchange rate and food subsidy policies.
Our empirical results indicate that global food price shocks are a risk for almost all MENA countries. Yet, the exposure to food price shocks varies significantly by country. We find that the full transmission process of international food prices into domestic markets takes about one year. The estimated pass-through coefficients indicate that, on average, a 1 percent increase of world food prices can increase domestic food prices by some 0.2-0.4 percent. The pass-through effects are notably higher for Egypt, Iraq, Djibouti, the UAE, and West Bank and Gaza. By contrast, Algeria and Tunisia appear less affected.
Another important finding is that international price transmission is highly
asymmetric. An increase in world food prices is typically transmitted into domestic food markets, but a decline in world food prices rarely transmits at the same degree.
Thus, the finding of asymmetric price transmission suggests that not only international food price levels matter, but also food price volatility. 6 For countries with high food dependency ratios, limited fiscal space, and expected volatility in commodity markets, this phenomenon arguably poses significant future challenges.
Government interventions including food price subsidies and controls, along with political insecurity in the region, may have contributed to a sluggish market response to downward movements in world food prices. However, this paper does not identify systematically the causes of the asymmetric food price transmission process. They are complex and should be an area for future research.
Following next is section 2 which documents the sources for the MENA food time-series price data and presents statistics that explore MENA"s potential exposure to food price shocks, including dependency ratios by food commodity. Section 3 reviews the empirical literature on food price pass-through effects, with the aim of establishing benchmarks and informing the empirical methodology. Section 4 details the econometric approach, while section 5 presents pass-through coefficients for 18
MENA countries. It shows also food price transmission dynamics and decompositions of pass-through estimates into approximate sources. Section 6 concludes with a summary.
What Do the Data Tell Us?
Historic In general, domestic food inflation in MENA remained lower than global food inflation, and in most Arab economies food inflation remained positive even during the period when international food inflation turned negative. This fact is consistent with asymmetric transmission of international food price fluctuations to domestic markets in the Arab world -a hypothesis investigated in the second part of this paper.
As a first attempt to understand the exposure of the MENA countries to global food shocks, we present ratios of net imports to domestic consumption of key food commodities, together with their respective import and consumption shares, by country (Table 1A ) and country groupings (Table 1B) . The ratios of net imports to domestic consumption are indicative of the dependency on foreign imports to satisfy domestic demand for grains, edible oils, meat, and sugar. The analysis covers grain and non-grain imports; the latter account for approximately half of all food imports in developing MENA (Table 1B ). In the GCC their share is just under 30 percent.
Dependency ratios, presented in Table 1A , are calculated as:
( 1) where denotes the net imports of food product i and is the domestic consumption of food product i, with i corresponding to grains, edible oils, meat, and sugar. Dependency ratios (D i ) are aggregated across the four food groupings for a particular country by computing the ratio of net total imports over total food consumption of the four food groups. Dependency ratios across country groupings are then aggregated using simple averages. The analysis looks at the most important food products for MENA countries which are grains, edible oils, sugar, beef, and poultry.
In all developing MENA countries, except Lebanon, grains account for the largest share in total food consumption, while in high-income GCC meat has the highest weight in the consumption basket (Table 1A) . Dependence on food imports in general is high across MENA except in Iran, and nearly complete (around or above 90 percent) in all GCC economies, except Saudi Arabia where it is 80 percent. Thus, in the absence of policies to soften the impact of world food price fluctuations, the passthrough effects from world to domestic prices should be largest in the GCC economies, as well as in some other countries, such as Yemen, Iraq, and Jordan.
To gauge the first-round effects of a sharp increase in key food prices we also compute the corresponding increase in the import bill as a share of the 2010 GDP and as a share of international reserves, excluding gold. Sugar prices were up 39 percent, while beef prices rose 22 percent. Only the prices for olive oil and poultry declined during this period. 9 The assumption is that import prices are the prices prevailing in major international markets for each commodity, expressed in US$, and that demand and supply do not respond to changes in prices. Oils n/a n/a n/a Oils 59% 24% 21%
Meat 88% 62% 65% Meat n/a n/a n/a The impact on the import bill of these price increases in the MENA region is estimated at 0.6 percent of GDP, and 1.4 percent of international reserves, with grains making the largest contribution, followed by edible oils, sugar, and meat (Table 2) .
Oil importers are hardest hit by the increase in food prices. The increase in the import bill is estimated to be 1.2 percent of GDP, with half of the increase attributed to the impact of higher grain prices. This is consistent with the high share of grains in the import basket (Table 1B) .
The expected increase in the import bill of the developing oil exporters as a result of higher food prices is estimated at 0.8 percent of GDP and 2.3 percent of international reserves. Increases in prices of edible oils and sugar account for more than half of the increase in the import bill. Dependency on imported edible oils and sugar is high; therefore, despite smaller shares in the import basket, these two groups have a large effect on the import bill.
The GCC countries are expected to be least impacted by the higher food prices at the macro level as they have small populations and high per capita incomes. The overall impact on the GCC is estimated to be 0.3 percent of GDP and 0.5 percent of international reserves, with the largest shock coming from the increase in sugar prices, reflecting a surge in prices of sugar and high sugar import dependency (Table 1B) Dependency ratios give important insights into MENA"s overall exposure to price shocks. It shows that, from a macroeconomic perspective, the impact of high international food prices on GDP and international reserves is sizable for most developing MENA countries, mainly because of the big role of grain imports for domestic consumption. This finding is consistent with MENA"s high grain import dependency, the high grain import share, and the large increase in world grain prices compared with world meat prices. International prices of oils and sugar jumped, in some cases, by more than the prices of grains but their lower share in imports implies a smaller effect on the import bills.
This analysis gives an idea about the relative importance of different food commodities on macroeconomic indicators such as aggregate imports, yet it ignores second-round effects and may heavily misrepresent the impact on consumer prices, which can vary significantly due to individual country characteristics and policies. To what degree international food price fluctuations are transmitted into MENA markets, is analyzed in the following sections.
Perspectives on Food Price Pass-Through
The empirical literature on the transmission of international food price shocks is abundant. It features studies that apply different econometric methodologies to isolate the effect of various factors on domestic price levels. Studies typically present multicountry analyses which include both developed and developing economies, but most countries in MENA other than Egypt have been omitted due to difficulties with obtaining price data. Anderson and Tyers (1992) use error-correction models to compute short and long-run transmission elasticities for changes in border prices relative to domestic producer prices for 30 countries and 7 agricultural commodities for the period 1961-1983. They find average pass-through coefficients of about 0.3 for most countries. Quiroz and Soto (1995) estimate an aggregate agricultural pass-through elasticity for 78 countries between 1966 and 1991. They find much lower transmission for most countries, and no transmission in the long run. For the developing countries they present a mixed picture. In about one third of the developing countries, there is no transmission even in the long-run, while in the remaining it can take years to transmit a world price shock to domestic prices. In comparison, Mundlak and Larson (1992) note high transmission elasticities for world prices and exchange rates for 58 countries , but as argued by Quiroz and Soto (1995) , this might be due to a spurious regression problem, which they corrected in their own study. A number of other papers (Baffes and Gardner 2003; Hazell et al. 1990; Sharma 2003) find mixed evidence of the effects of world food price fluctuations on domestic producer prices in the developing countries. More recent analysis includes Anderson (2010) , who uses error-correction models, and the IMF (2011), which relies on Vector AutoRegressions (VAR). Interestingly, despite different time periods, countries, and methods, they find average pass-through coefficients in the order of 0.3 for most countries. Ferrucci et al. (2010) , who use a VAR-methodology, also find that international commodity prices are the main determinant of producer and consumer food price inflation in the Euro area.
Studies rarely explain the choice of methodology. However, some papers shed some light on this issue. Fackler and Goodwin (2001) and Barret (2001) 
where c and t denote transport costs and tariffs on exports x and imports m; E is the nominal exchange rate, is the international price of food, and is the domestic price of food. The higher the costs associated with trade across borders are, the greater the wedge between domestic and world prices of food, and the greater the influence domestic market conditions will have on domestic prices, implying lower passthrough from world food to domestic food prices. In the case of MENA, where most of the countries are consistent net importers, the domestic prices will follow closely the import parity price, modified here to reflect the presence of subsidies s used widely in the MENA region:
Price subsidies can be used to insulate completely domestic prices from world food price and exchange rate fluctuations, but when international food prices are increasing at a rapid pace this means that subsidies will also have to increase rapidly in order to keep domestic prices stable. This is not always possible, especially in countries with limited fiscal space and high import food dependency. Take 
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We illustrate this situation on Figure 2 assuming that a country is a price taker in international food markets and faces a perfectly elastic import supply curve. 12 We assume also that the objective of the government is to keep domestic prices and imports of food as stable as possible via price subsidies on imported food. 13 If there is a shock to the world food price, resulting in a jump in the world price from P W up to
, the government will have to double the subsidy paid per unit of imported food in order to keep imports at levels prevailing at the old international prices P W .
Figure 2. Impact of Subsidies on Domestic Food Prices
As discussed above doubling of subsidies will be difficult in countries with limited fiscal space, implying that domestic prices P might move up. In our example, the 10 Food CPI increased by 20 percent in Jordan, 44 percent in Egypt, 21 percent in Syria, and 8 percent in Morocco between 2007 and 2009. 11 According to World Bank data, during the period 2007-09, food subsidies declined as a share of GDP from 1.8 percent to 0.8 percent in Jordan, and from 2.1 percent to 1.4 percent in Syria. Food subsidies remained at 0.7 percent in Morocco, and increased from 1.3 percent to 2.0 percent in Egypt. 12 Note the analysis does not change if we assume that the country can affect prices and is facing an upward sloping import supply curve. 13 Commitment to price stability is signaled by the prevalence of price controls in MENA on certain types of food products. Price controls can be viewed as flexible subsidies that accommodate perfectly fluctuations in the price. According to Ortiz et al. (2011) , Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, and Djibouti use also price controls on certain food products. Some of these use both price controls and price subsidies. If the world food price P W falls down to the domestic price P, then the government might decide not to pay the subsidy s per unit of imported food. This will have the effect of keeping the domestic food price stable at P, and food consumption at M. In this case government interventions related to prices subsidies might have an asymmetric effect on domestic prices. Under asymmetric transmission, increases in world food prices will be accumulating and pushing food price levels up. Volatility in global food prices would, therefore, be especially harmful, even in countries with extensive subsidy programs.
In general, the reasons behind the asymmetric transmission of prices are often complex (Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel, 2004) , and associated with a number of factors. 14 There is evidence that adjustment issues at the wholesale or retail level of distribution might be causing domestic prices to be downward sticky. Uncertainty of whether food price shocks are permanent or transitory, along with political uncertainty in some MENA countries, might also exacerbate market reluctance to respond to food price signals. Non-competitive practices in the domestic and/or international market will also contribute to the asymmetric response. In fact, Morisset 14 Albers et al. (2011) provide evidence of non-linearity of international food price transmission into domestic prices for a number of Mediterranean countries in the MENA region.
Econometric Approach
As a baseline model for the calculations of the pass-through effects, we consider the following simple autoregressive model that explicitly focuses on the short-run correlations between international and domestic food prices: , 
The logic behind equation (4) In addition to world food prices, exchange rate shocks are important in determining inflation. If the domestic currency depreciates (appreciates), international food price increases will have a stronger (weaker) pass-through effect. This is a significant consideration, because some of the inflationary effects could be due to currency movements, rather than changes in world food prices. We also take advantage of findings on food price transmission (Meyer and Cramon-Taubadel 2004; Peltzman, 2000; Vavra and Goodwin, 2005) , and consider increases or decreases in commodity prices as separate variables. This allows us to determine whether the transmission is asymmetric and the extent of asymmetry. Therefore, the baseline model in equation (3) is transformed into a threshold regression, which controls for lagged growth rates in the domestic exchange rate, , and allows studying asymmetric food price transmission:
To facilitate a consistent interpretation across MENA countries, we derive estimates of the 6 and 12-month pass-through effects from cumulative impulse response functions. 15 The coefficients show the models" predicted adjustment of domestic food prices to changes in world food prices, controlling for the exchange rate and domestic factors. In most countries, the food price pass-through effects fade out after about one year. Our pass-through coefficients are, therefore, identical to those that can be directly obtained from equation (4).
When estimating the models, we use monthly data from December 1998 to mid-2011 for most countries, allowing for lags. The cumulative lag structure is chosen to minimize the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and by lag exclusion tests. The optimal lag length is found to be . In some country cases (Lebanon, Djibouti, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE) we use less lags because of the short time series. For these countries, the results are sensitive to outliers. Hence, we selectively employ impulse dummies to correct for extreme jumps in domestic food prices (i.e. due to religious holidays, specific national events, or weather effects). We also use time trends when significant to capture other unknown exogenous factors on domestic prices. Because we estimate the model in annual growth rates, we explicitly control for seasonal factors.
Empirical Results

Pass-Through Coefficients
The dynamics and the magnitude of the food price pass-through largely vary by country (Table 3) . International food price shocks are a risk for many Arab countries despite food subsidies that are widely believed to shield consumers from increases in 15 Impulse response functions allow us to trace out the time path of the effect of structural food price shocks from the autoregressive model. Accumulated impulse response functions compute the cumulative sum of the shock over time.
domestic food prices. The average pass-through effect for the region as a whole is 0.25, only slightly lower than the "average" estimate of the effect in the literature (0.3). The slightly lower average effect is consistent with the high prevalence of policies intended to cushion consumers and limit movements in domestic food prices in nearly all MENA countries. To get a sense of robustness of our estimates, we use Monte Carlo simulation
(1,000 iterations) and bootstrap standard errors for the 6 and 12-month food price pass-through coefficients, shown in Table 3 . For many countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and WBG, the estimated 12-month pass-through elasticities are statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
For other countries, the pass-through coefficients are not significant, possibly due to limited price transmission (i.e. policy interventions in the cases of Algeria and Tunisia) or relatively short time-series rendering the coefficients insignificant (i.e.
Lebanon, Djibouti and Yemen).
We also tested the robustness of the results to the choice of the food price index. We used the FAO world food price index, which is an alternative to the World Bank"s food price index. Both indices are similar, but the FAO index shows higher peaks in 2011. The main effect of using the FAO index is to increase the standard errors of the coefficients, while preserving the pass-through coefficients. Using disaggregated world price index data for cereal, from the FAO and World Bank, produces lower pass-through coefficients than those obtained from aggregated indices. This result is consistent with a lower share of cereal than total food consumption in household expenditures.
The market exchange rates vis-à-vis the euro work best because even in oilproducing MENA countries, a significant share of food imports is denominated in euro. The nominal effective exchange rate, which is a trade-weighted average of the nominal exchange rate, might not be a good proxy for import prices because it also contains export data. Nevertheless, the type of exchange rate choice does not impact significantly the size of the pass-through coefficients.
As it is visible in Table 3 , a decline in international food prices does not transmit into domestic food markets and virtually in all MENA countries prices are highly downward-sticky. 16 Commodity price volatility is thus having an asymmetric effect on domestic prices: only price increases are transmitted, whereas consumers do not benefit from a decline in food prices. These results are consistent with the findings 16 The UAE and Yemen are the only exceptions.
of FAO (2009) and Moghaddasi (2009) , 17 and food subsidies might play a role, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
Dynamics of Food Price Transmission
In MENA the dynamics and the magnitudes of the food price pass-through vary by country. The transmission takes about one year to reach full impact, but in many cases is already apparent after about 3-6 months. The percentage change in domestic food prices to a 1 percent increase in international food prices by individual MENA countries is described below.
In the developing oil importing countries of the region, the pass-through effects appear relatively pronounced, but the speed of transmission varies across countries ( Figure 3) . Djibouti, one of the poorest countries in the region with a fragile food security situation, shows the strongest pass-through effects both in terms of magnitude and transmission speed. Similarly, the food price transmission in the West
Bank and Gaza appears to be very strong, reaching above 0.6 percent after 12 months.
In Egypt, the food price pass-through is significant and visible after a few months and after about 10 months it reaches its peak. A 1 percent increase in international food prices increases the domestic price of food by more than 0.4 percent. The relatively high levels of food inflation are also due to domestic factors, such as pressure from growing demand and unfavorable weather events ( Figure 6 ).
In Jordan, food price transmission starts to pick-up after about 6 months, and the overall effect after one year is similar to that in Egypt. A 1 percent increase in world food prices increases the domestic prices by approximately 0.4 percent. The relatively slow transmission can be explained by the combined effect of a number of government interventions, such as consumer price subsidies and controls, release of grain reserves, and tax reductions of several agricultural inputs, including fuel.
Without these measures the pass-through effect would be much stronger given
Jordan"s near complete dependency on imports of grains, sugar, meat, and edible oils. -22-increase in world food prices lifts domestic prices by some 0.39 percent. The delay in transmission can be attributed to a number of factors, including the government"s decision to use subsidies to regulate domestic food prices, suspension of customs duties on cereal imports, suspension of local tax collection targeting fresh food traded in wholesale markets, and price control operations to contain price increases resulting from speculation.
In Lebanon, a 1 percent increase in world food prices translates into a 0.3 percent increase in the prices of domestic foodstuff. High government subsidies for food and fuel (Albers and Peeters, 2011) help explain the relatively slow and mild pass-through effects. In Tunisia, the food price pass-through is small -a 1 percent increase in international food prices increases the domestic price of food by only 0.06 percent. Price controls and food subsidies seem to undermine effectively the transmission of international food prices into domestic prices.
In the developing oil exporting countries of MENA, the pass-through effects are diverse, and range from small in Algeria to large in Iraq (Figure 4 ). In Algeria, rising international food prices have little overall effect on domestic prices. Algeria"s food price controls and other government interventions effectively protect the consumers from food price shocks.
In Iran, food price transmission is gradual and reaches its peak after 10 months. A 1 percent increase in international prices translates into a 0.3 percent increase in domestic food prices. Several factors affect the magnitude of the passthrough. A more significant agricultural sector, which implies lower food import dependency relative to other MENA countries, has the effect of weakening the price transmission, while reform of the national subsidy system has the effect of strengthening the pass-through.
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In Iraq, food price transmission occurs in a step-wise fashion. Pass-through is relatively slow during the first 6 months, but becomes quite significant after 12 months. Eventually, a 1 percent increase of world food prices increases domestic prices by almost 0.5 percent. The stepwise effects might be explained by the fact that
Iraq is a net food importer, which partly relies on a food ration system. 18 In December 2010, the Government of Iran removed widespread subsidies on oil products, electricity, water, gas, bread, and other basic products. In Syria the pass-through is relatively fast, but appears less pronounced than in other countries because domestic policies encourage domestic production and regulate food prices. The transmission has occurred primarily through the prices of corn and sugar (Table 1A) . Syria is quasi self-sufficient in wheat production and the government controls the domestic price of wheat.
Similarly, in Yemen, the pass-through is relatively fast. Yemen is among the ten countries in the world with the highest rates of food insecurity, thus explaining the rapid transmission. The high pass-through reflects grains and sugar price developments (Table 1) . In Yemen a decline in world food prices appears to transmit into the domestic market.
In developed MENA, the world food price pass-through to domestic prices is slower relative to the speed of transmission in the developing MENA countries ( Figure 5 ). In Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, pass-through effects become visible after about 7 months. By contrast, in Oman pass-through effects appear after just 3 months. The relative slow transmission is consistent with the fact that these countries have fiscal space to support stable food price through subsidy programs and other measures. Without such policies transmission would be much quicker and stronger given complete dependence on imports of grains and other major commodities. In all GCC countries, except UAE, the food price pass-through effects are below 0.4 percent. In UAE the pass-through effects are relatively fast and stronger than the GCC average. UAE is also among the few countries where a world food price decline transmits rapidly into the domestic market.
The data suggests that most Arab countries have been affected by the food prices increases since the 2006 global food crisis. Evidence suggests that it takes on average 4 times longer and costs 3.5 times more to import wheat in an Arab country than in the Netherlands. However, there are significant differences in supply chain performance across the MENA region, with some countries having bottlenecks at the port, while others having inefficient inland transportation systems. The findings finally support the view that countries could reduce food price pressures to some degree by tackling domestic issues. Policies aimed at improving procurement, logistics, stockpiling, and planning practices and strategic investments in domestic market infrastructure may help to reduce domestic food prices in the medium-run (Lampietti et al, 2011) . Such measures would need to be country-specific and depend on the local cost-build-up of imported food commodities. Countryspecific identification of major infrastructural bottlenecks may, therefore, be advantageous. Other areas may include an assessment of the role of regional trade, overall supply chain efficiency, and instruments of modern price risk managementall of which could help to smoothen supply and cereal stock shortages.
This paper looks at aggregate food price pass-through effects only. We do so because of data limitations, but also because we are interested in the question of countries" vulnerability to global food price shocks in general. For a more in-depth understanding of pass-through effects, one would need to go beyond aggregate food price analysis, and estimate these effects by commodity and country. Thus, there should be efforts to collect more systematically domestic commodity price data. I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV   2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 
